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Romania’s Intelligence Community: From
an Instrument of Dictatorship to Serving
Democracy
‘‘. . .Romania is an extraordinary partner that is willing to make all
sacrifices in order to transform the world into a freer one.’’
Condoleezza Rice1
Romania’s intelligence system has followed a path from serving as an
instrument of communist dictatorship to being an effective intelligence
community under democratic control. This achievement is notable,
considering both the relatively short amount of time for the transition and
the foundations of the organization—the Securitate.
With the collapse of Communism in 1989, Romania transitioned from an
authoritarian regime to a functioning democracy, thereby disproving
scholars’ skepticism with regard to its low chances for democratic
consolidation.2 Its road to a free society has been long and difficult, but,
despite a series of shortcomings and failures, Romania has built up from
ground zero the basic democratic institutions (political society, rule of law,
state-apparatus, economic society, and a functioning civil society),3
demonstrating that its ‘‘course towards democracy is irreversible.’’4 One by
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one, the Communist barriers have been demolished, including the country’s
intelligence system; the intelligence mechanism has transited from a genuine
Communist-era ‘‘inquisition,’’ which destroyed interpersonal relations with
people of all ages spying on friends and relatives to a professional,
accountable, and transparent community, which actually works for the
citizenry, as required by democratic principles.
Yet, the end of the Cold War has produced not only more pluralistic
democracies, market economies, and respect for human rights, it has as
well brought forth more diverse security dangers, less visible and less
predictable. Events like 11 September 2001 (9=11), the Madrid bombing
of 2004, the London bombings of July 2005, and the India bombing
in 2006 have made the world fully aware of these threats; terrorism
showed there is no single Achilles’ heel but a series of mounting
vulnerabilities and insecurities. Nations have come to understand the need
for reassessing their security concepts and transform their ‘‘threat
diagnosticians’’—the national intelligence communities. As well, they
became aware that they cannot tackle the challenges of the new century
alone, but must do so through concerted cooperation and action in the
fields of intelligence, law-enforcement, and justice, at both the national
and international levels.
Romania, too, now firmly committed to the international efforts to avert
and counter the new security threats and challenges, has contributed directly
to the world’s peace and security. It is a member of various multinational,
regional, and subregional security organizations, including the United
Nations (UN) and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the
European Union (EU). It has contributed to the allied forces’ operations
in the first Gulf War, the peace operations in Afghanistan, Bosnia,
Kosovo, Albania, and Iraq and, after the end of hostilities, has been
involved in security and reconstruction activities. Ten percent of the
Romanian forces participating in multinational operations are intelligence
professionals.5 Its new intelligence agencies are now cooperating with other
similar institutions within a larger international framework in pursuit of
shared objectives of countering the new security threats, at the national,
regional, and international levels. Their professionalism and effectiveness
are promoting Romania as a trusted partner in the world’s quest for
democratic security.
Thus, the transition of the Romanian intelligence community from
the Communist Securitate to democratic control and effectiveness
followed two paths: one drawn by democratization (by establishing new
institutions and bringing them under democratic control) and the other
drawn by the security environment (through redefined roles and
missions).
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Before 1989 Romania featured a highly repressive Communist regime, under
the dictator, Nicolae Ceausescu. Under his reign, dominated by an
exaggerated cult of personality, corruption, and the infringement of human
rights, Romania plunged into a social, economic, and moral decline, along
with a seclusion from Western, democratic civilization. Romanians
endured severe social and economic conditions, including starvation, a lack
of medicines and other basic amenities, regular power blackouts, the lack
of adequate heating during the winter,6 and the interdiction of abortion.7
To consolidate his power, Ceausescu used a ruthlessly effective intelligence
apparatus, the Securitate, which became the largest Eastern European
intelligence agency in relation to total population. With the Securitate as
the ‘‘armed brace’’ of his rule, Ceausescu transformed Romania into a
police state, dominated by physical suffering and moral torture. The
Securitate maintained rigid controls on the entire populace, keeping tabs
and records via recruiting a considerable network of collaborators and
informers, including children. The ‘‘enemies of the regime’’ underwent
permanent surveillance (including mail, telephones, offices, and homes),
harassment, and imprisonment. The result was a pervasive atmosphere of
fear, intimidation, suspicion, and mistrust.8 As former Securitate official
Ion Mihai Pacepa observed: ‘‘It was psychological terror that paralyzed
the Romanian populat ion, and the most outs tanding piece of
disinformation was the rumor, deliberately spread by Securitate itself, that
one out of every four Romanians was a Securitate informer.’’9
TOWARD DEMOCRATIC CONTROL AND EFFECTIVENESS
It all ended in December 1989 when a revolution took place, which abolished
the Communist regime, killed Ceausescu and his very influential wife, Elana,
dismantled the Securitate, and opened a new chapter for Romania—
democracy. Since then, Romania has been able to shape a new intelligence
system, placed under legal basis and defined mandates, tailored to the
post–Cold War security challenges and threats. It also strengthened
mechanisms of control and oversight to ensure that the intelligence
apparatus works within the context of the rule of law, human rights,
checks and balances, while allowing it to prepare for the threats and
challenges of the future.
THE NEED FOR INTELLIGENCE IN ROMANIA
At the moment, no major internal or external threats to Romanian security
are imminent; no inter-ethnic conflicts are flaring in Romania (the minorities
enjoy equal rights and liberties as Romanian citizens and are represented in
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the Parliament), and Romania has good neighborly relations, based on
cooperation and mutual help.
Nevertheless, potential threats to Romania’s security include ineffective
government affected by corruption and political clientelism; organized
crime; human, drug, and arms trafficking; and illegal migration run by
either domestic or foreign networks.
In addition, Romania could become a terrorist target for a variety of
reasons. First, its geographical position in the proximity of certain insecure
or latent-conflict zones, such as Trandsniestria and the Balkans. As well,
the numerous Muslim and Arabic representation in Romania (over
200,000) could transform Romania into a hub or harbor for terrorist
movements targeting not only Romania but also other countries.10 Second,
despite its good relations with the Arab world, due in large measure to a
significant Muslim population presence, Romania’s participation in the
international coalition against terrorism and its Strategic Partnership with
the United States could easily lead to attacks on Romanian troops
stationed in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as on its people and on its
diplomatic, cultural, and economic institutions, in country or abroad. In
fact, Romania had to deal with a terrorist act when three journalists were
kidnapped in Iraq in 2005 by a group of terrorists. Third, the possibility of
permanent U.S. military bases on Romanian territory may lead to
targeting by terrorists. Fourth, with its recent accession into the EU,
Romania becomes the EU’s largest eastern border, thereby generating new
security risks.
These threats call for a modern and efficient system of projection,
planning, and assessment of security policy, a new legal framework to
reflect the new security challenges, and strengthened training and
education. Thus, not only is good, professional intelligence in Romania,
adjusted to the current spectrum of threats and capable to assist
Romanian policymakers needed; necessary, too, is an intelligence
community that is compatible and interoperable with its Western
counterparts, and cooperates with them effectively in the war on terror. An
objective analysis indicates that, during the last sixteen years, Romania,
with great effort, has largely achieved these goals.
NEW INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
In the early 1990s, Romania created a new intelligence system by dividing the
former Securitate into several agencies, which retained the former
Communist intelligence system’s infrastructure, logistics, and personnel
(including some of the collaborators), as well as the Securitate archives of
files on the Romanian citizenry. Today, six intelligence agencies have
replaced the Securitate:11 the independent Romanian Intelligence Service
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(SRI); the Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE); the Guard and Protection
Service (SPP); the Special Telecommunication Service (STS); the ministerial
General Directorate for Intelligence and Internal Protection (DGIPI); and
the Directorate for General Information of the Army (DGIA). In
compliance with their mandate, as defined by the legal framework, the
agencies conduct domestic and foreign intelligence and counter or security
intelligence, as well as military=police intelligence. They have human
intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), and imaging
intelligence (IMINT) capabilities and can use undercover agents.
THE INDEPENDENT AGENCIES
(A). The Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI) was established by Decree 181
of 26 March 1990, and placed on a statutory basis with Law Number 14 of
1992, ‘‘Organization and Functioning of the Romanian Intelligence
Service.’’12 SRI is responsible for collection and analysis of intelligence
pertaining to Romania’s national security, including corruption.13 SRI
officials continue to lobby for transformation of the institution into a law
enforcement agency, with powers to arrest and detain.14 This will probably
happen in special situations such as prevention and combating terrorism.
(B). The Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE) is tasked with foreign intelligence
activities with respect to Romania’s national security and the safeguarding of
its national interests.15 The legal framework that regulates the SIE’s activity
is based on Law no. 51=1991 on national security, Law no. 415=2002 on the
organization and functioning of the CSAT, Law no. 182=2002 on the
protection of classified information, and Law no. 1=6 January 1998 on
the organization and functioning of the Foreign Intelligence Service, as
completed by the Emergency Ordinance (OUG) no. 154 on 21 November 2001.
(C). The Guard and Protection Service (SPP), an independent intelligence
agency, was set up on 7 May 1990 under decree 204 of the Provisional
Council of National Unity, to ensure the protection of the President,
Romanian government party leaders, and foreign diplomats. It was put on
a statutory basis by the Law no. 191 of 22 October 1998,16 which
stipulates that the SPP is responsible for the protection of Romanian
dignitaries, as well as for foreign officials and their families during their
stay in Romania. The Emergency Ordinance no. 103 of 2002 augmented
SPP’s areas of responsibility to organizing and conducting clandestine
collection and undercover operations.17
(D). Created in 1996, by Government Resolution 229 of 27 May 1993, the
Special Telecommunication Service (STS) organizes and coordinates the
telecommunications activities for the public authorities in Romania and for
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other users, in accordance with the law.18 The institution provides national
signals intelligence (SIGINT.) It is also believed that the STS has agents
operating undercover.
MINISTERIAL AGENCIES
(A). The Ministry of Defense’s Directorate for General Information of the
Armed Forces (DGIA), created by the Emergency Ordinance Number 14
of 26 January 2001, is charged with intelligence collection and analysis of
domestic and external, military and nonmilitary threats to national
security. It is responsible for ensuring the protection of security
information and cryptographic activities as well as the geographical
intelligence needed by the military.19 The Directorate for Intelligence and
Military Representation (DIRM), which monitors the service’s foreign
activities, and the Directorate for Military Security (DSM), the former
Counter-Espionage Department, are now subordinated to DGIA.20 DGIA
operates undercover and may have combatant units under subordination.21
(B). The General Directorate for Intelligence and Internal Protection (DGIPI),
also known as UM 0962, was created in 1999 from the counterintelligence
department of the Ministry of the Interior,22 which was established on 1
February 1990.23 DGIPI is charged with collection and processing of
intelligence pertaining to organized crime and terrorism. It is believed to
employ the highest percentage of former Securitate personnel among all of
the intelligence agencies.
CHALLENGES OF THE TRANSITION PROCESS
Following its transition from a counterintelligence state to a democracy, a
principal challenge for Romania was constraining its new intelligence
apparatus to work within the boundaries of democracy while still being
effective. This has been especially difficult since the newly-created
intelligence system was established on the ruins of the former Securitate.
The populace’s hostility toward the former Securitate officers, lack of
confidence in the state institutions, the incomplete and dysfunctional legal
framework and oversight, as well as the lack of transparency, shed a bad
light on the intelligence agencies during the first years of transition. In time,
the situation changed in favor of democracy: legislation on the organization
and functioning of the intelligence agencies was enacted and continues to be
amended; civilian democratic control and oversight were institutionalized
and strengthened; and personnel management was improved with modern
recruitment, education, and training techniques, while a dialogue with the
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civil society was established. The legacy of the past was dissipated, leaving
room for effectiveness, professionalism, and credibility.
BALANCING SECRECY AND ACCOUNTABILITY: THE ROLE
OF CONTROL AND OVERSIGHT
Establishing a legal framework was not sufficient for molding the behavior of
the intelligence agencies and holding them responsible for their actions.
Instituting effective control mechanisms for both direction and oversight of
the intelligence community is mandatory in a democracy.24 In the
aftermath of the anti-Ceausescu revolution, the security agencies lacked
transparency, became politicized and carried out missions beyond their
legal mandate, often infringing human rights and liberties. The need to
scrutinize the activity of the intelligence agencies in order to make them
accountable, impartial, and transparent was evident. Mechanisms of
control and oversight were therefore created to balance the tension
between security and liberty, and ensure that the intelligence agencies
implement and observe the legal framework imposed upon them. Besides
formal mechanisms, other oversight means now exist to keep the
intelligence agencies accountable and responsible to the citizens.
Executive Management
Executive control consists of giving directions in regards to tasking,
prioritizing, and making resources available. Executive control over
Romanian intelligence is exercised by the National Defense Supreme
Council (CSAT), which was established under Law Number 39 of 13
December 1990 to organize and coordinate the activity of the
intelligence agencies.25 The CSAT members are the President (chair),
Prime Minister (vice-chair), the Ministers for Industry, Defense, Interior
and Foreign Affairs, the President’s National Security Advisor, the SRI
and SIE directors, and the Chief of the General Staff. It coordinates the
organization and functioning of the agencies, initiates documents to be
subjected to Parliament’s approval (e.g., the doctrine of national defense
and the structure of the national defense system) and assesses and
endorses intelligence drafts and the national security strategy and the
military strategy.26 The CSAT meets frequently; in 2005, for instance,
CSAT met and adopted over 180 resolutions pertaining to Romania’s
national security, of which twenty-two were related solely to the
intelligence agencies and protection of NATO’s classified information.27
Executive control was strengthened by the CSAT’s adoption of an inter-
ministerial cooperation protocol during crisis situations in 2001, which
empowered the Prime Minister to exercise control over all the
intelligence services during crises. (The Prime Minister would normally
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have jurisdiction over only the ministerial services.)28 In addition, the
financial activities of the agencies are audited by the Ministry of Public
Finances, which exercises a delegated preemptive financial verification
power, and clears and authorizes the legality of some collection activities.29
From this standpoint, the CSAT arguably exercises a robust and dynamic
control of Romania’s intelligence activities.
Legislative Review
The legislative control and oversight of all intelligence agencies include
establishing their legal framework, structure, and mandates, and
monitoring the implementation of the legislation, providing funds for
intelligence, and holding the agencies accountable for the budget and for
the way they spend it, reviewing their activities, as well as utilizing the
intelligence they produce. Parliamentary oversight of the ministry services
is carried out in accordance with the stipulations of the Romanian
Constitution, with the ministerial heads accountable before Parliament.
Thus, the DGIA and DGIPI report to their ministries, but the government
institutions are accountable to the Parliament, and the two ministers could
be questioned or interpellated by Parliament.
Parliamentary control of intelligence in Romania is exercised through
standing=permanent and special=select committees: the standing
committees oversee the activities of all intelligence agencies; the
select=special committees oversee the activities of the independent
agencies. The members of the permanent committees—Committees for
Defense, Public Order, and National Security of both the Senate and
Deputies Chambers—are elected during each legislative session, with the
following responsibilities: initiating and amending laws related to public
order, national defense, and security; approval of the budget and
monitoring the way the funds are spent; requesting periodical or ad hoc
reports from the intelligence agencies; appointing and=or revoking state
authorities, including heads of the intelligence services; information and
documentation visits at the intelligence agencies; along with Legislative
motions, investigations, and hearings. The special parliamentary
committees—Special Common Committee of SRI Oversight and Special
Common Committee of SIE Oversight—oversee, along the standing
committees, the activities of the independent intelligence services (SIE and
SRI) as follows:
. verify Constitutional and legal compliance of the services’ activities;
. investigate allegations of illegal intelligence collection;
. hold hearings on presidential nominees for director positions;
. assess the directors’ annual reports, submitting their reviews to the Parliament;
. request SRI and SIE data and information;
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. investigate the directors of the agencies and their staff members;
. conduct unannounced visits to the agencies.30
Despite such great authority granted to the committees, parliamentary
oversight has been occasionally challenged by a series of factors, including
the state’s initial focus on other issues (elections, building new institutions,
and supporting economic reforms); deficient parliamentary expertise in
intelligence matters (as members of the committees change with every
legislature); poor cooperation and coordination among parliamentary
committees, as well as between former and current members of the
oversight committees; and hostile attitude of the intelligence agencies when
requested to provide information.31 Of late, however, the situation has
improved with the authorities taking an active role in ensuring the
democratization of the intelligence agencies. The parliamentarians’
expertise increased through various training programs; committees became
more actively involved in the oversight through participating in more
debates and meetings; and they all became more aware of the need for
protection of classified information by setting up a leak prevention
program.32
Fiscal Oversight. Control over the budget is ensured in various ways. First,
the Parliament’s permanent committees exercise their power through
approval of the budget of the security institutions and the annual
adoption=revision of the Law on State Budget on the allocations to the
security institutions. Second, the special committees have the right to
assess the draft budgetary allocations for the intelligence agencies and
submit their reviews to the Parliament. Third, the government is required
to report before the Parliament once a year on its activity, usually during
the drafting of the following year’s allocations. Fourth, the Court of
Audits, an independent body with budgetary attributions that functions in
support of the Parliament, has control powers over the administration and
use of the financial resources of the State and of the public sector, as well
as over the management of the public and private patrimony of the state
and of the territorial administrative units.
Investigations represent the Romanian Parliament’s most powerful
oversight tool, beyond the power over the budget. This function is
exercised through either permanent committees or special committees of
investigation; the committees report their findings to the Parliament,
which are debated in the chamber and made public.33 Two special
investigation committees have been set up so far on intelligence: the first
investigated the existence of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) flight
records and prisons operated on Romanian territory for dealing with
captured al-Qaeda leaders; the second investigated the disappearance of
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Omar Hayssam, a Romanian businessman of Syrian origin, who was
charged with terrorism and involvement in the kidnapping of three
Romanian journalists, and whose whereabouts the Romanian authorities
lost track of after his release from prison on parole (on medical
grounds).34 The investigation of the allegations of CIA wrongdoing were
completed, and, despite serious accusations by various countries, the
committee found that CIA did not operate prisons on Romanian
territory, nor did U.S. military or civilian flights that could have had
detainees on board operate over Romanian territory. This finding was
confirmed by a parallel committee of the European Union, which
reached the same conclusion. The Hayssam Committee investigations
were still in process in early 2007, with the Committee conducting
hearings on key persons.35
Other Tools. Interpellations and questions are the most frequently used
tools of the parliamentary committees, offering the possibility and benefit
of prompt and permanent supervision of governmental policies and the
enforcement of laws. In this context, for the 1992–1996 legislature, 33
percent of the interpellations were on national security issues; 50 percent for
the 1996–2000 legislature and less than that for the 2000–2004 legislature.36
Simple motions to establish the position of the Parliament on an internal or
foreign policy matter and censorship motions, through which the Parliament
starts a general debate on the government’s policy—which could entail the
withdrawing of the confidence vote granted to the executive—are other
important parliamentary oversight tools.37 Although all motions have so
far been rejected they proved effective after a certain time, resulting the fall
of a cabinet, and the removal from office of some ministers.38
Overall, despite inherent challenges, the Romanian Parliament has strong
tools to ensure government of the people, by the people, and for the people.
The Romanian legislature is a forceful check and balance system, highly
capable of keeping the intelligence community operating in accordance with
high standards of accountability and effectiveness, and thereby avoiding too
much power being concentrated in the hands of the intelligence agencies.
Romania is currently amending existing legislation in order to augment the
Parliament’s powers, with the view of strengthening the legislative oversight
of the intelligence agencies, as a guarantee of a balance between secrecy and
security and openness and transparency.39 To cite Romanian President
Traian Basescu: ‘‘The Parliament [currently] controls the intelligence
agencies and has the right to do any type of investigation.’’40
Judicial
Judicial oversight is another means of scrutinizing the activities of intelligence
agencies at the national level. The judiciary monitors the agencies’ use of
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their special powers to ensure an appropriate balance between the protection
of citizens’ rights and the collection of information by intrusive or covert
surveillance and searches. But this type of oversight is very weak in
Romania because of the high degree of corruption, and due to the weak
legal framework with regard to judicial supervision. For example, between
1989 and 2002, 14,267 warrants were requested by the intelligence agencies
for wiretapping, none of which was denied by the general prosecutor. Of
the warrants issued, only about two percent resulted in an indictment,41
while the services justified the remaining 98 with ‘‘prevention.’’42 Concerns
remain that this surveillance is being conducted for political purposes or to
monitor citizens in personal vendettas. The hope is that, with the EU
membership, this situation wil l be ameliorated. The watch dog
organization, Freedom House, rates the country’s judicial framework and
independence at 4.00 for 2006, and acknowledges the government’s
determination to reduce external influence on the judiciary.43
Internal
Internal control is implemented by specialized bodies of the intelligence
agencies (e.g., a judicial department within the SRI) to ensure that the
agencies comply with both policy and the legal framework in which they
are mandated to operate. Some agencies also have an internal financial
control mechanism.
Other Types of Oversight
Other oversight procedures keep the intelligence agencies accountable and
responsible to the citizens, including a powerful civil society and media, the
Council for Studying Securitate Archives (CNSAS), and the Ombudsman. In
addition to the national mechanisms, international mechanisms, among them
the European Court of Human Rights, located at Strasbourg, have been
created to ensure citizens’ protection against abuses, and to which citizens
and states have the right to complain against any violations of human rights.
CIVIL SOCIETY AND TRANSPARENCY
When the country’s political transition began, intelligence agencies had a
negative public image due to the still-present shadow of the Securitate—
not easy for the society to forgive and forget—a nascent civil society,
sensationalist media and deficient public relations channels within the
agencies, attempts by the government to undermine active independent
civil society organizations, as well as an incomplete legal framework. Of
late, the situation has improved considerably, as has the relationship
between the civil society and the intelligence agencies. The government has
devolved by strengthening the legal framework on the functioning of civil
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society and increasingly using civil society experts for policy matters, thus
easing and increasing the involvement of non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) in the monitoring of the government’s activities. Likewise, the
intelligence agencies sought a common denominator between effectiveness
through secrecy and openness through transparency. They, too, have
established a culture of an open society, aimed at disseminating a security
culture among public authorities, members of academia, NGOs,
journalists, analysts, and students, with the ultimate goal of increasing
their awareness of the need and importance of efficient, non-suppressive
intelligence for both Romania and the Euro–Atlantic region. Examples of
the government’s collaboration with the goal of a civil society include the
Monitoring Exercise of Instruments and Mechanisms for Parliamentary
Oversight of the Security Sector in Romania, issued by the Parliamentary
Committee for Defense, Public Order and National Security of the House
of Deputies and EURISC foundation, with the Geneva Centre for the
Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF); the involvement of the
representatives of the NGOs in debating the new national security laws;
access to intelligence agencies’ press releases and websites; the possibility to
interview intelligence officials; participation in discussion panels; and
debates, conferences, and seminars.44
In addition, in line with current antiterrorist strategy, providing for a
strong cooperation with the civil society, the media, and other interest
groups, the intelligence agencies have established joint programs to train
the population on national security=safety issues. Thus, the agencies have
conducted several terrorism-awareness education and training programs for
the population (including students, mainly because they have been found
responsible for sixty percent of false bomb threats) and, in order to test
the authorities’ reaction in case of a potential terrorist attack, have
organized several intervention exercises simulating crisis situations. One of
these, simulating a terrorist attack during the transportation of radioactive
substances, was conducted for both international and Romanian
authorities. In addition, the SRI’s center for combating terrorism has made
available a telephone line for citizens to report any suspect situation or act.
Examples of the civil society’s success in scrutinizing the government
include lawsuits on the basis of the Law on Freedom of Information filed
by NGOs to boost transparency in various ministries, and the regulation
of state advertising in the media.45 The Romanian media, particularly, has
kept the intelligence system under strict observation and strongly influenced
the pace of reform. Despite attempts by the government to ‘‘curb its
enthusiasm’’ on several occasions, the media have been a more effective
oversight mechanism than the existing formal structures.46 Examples of
the media’s success in its oversight of intelligence include the decrease in the
number of agencies, and additional debates on this issue to comply with the
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EU’s requirements; the screening and=or firing of the former Securitate
officers and the recruiting of younger personnel; and access to Securitate
files and the identification of current public officials who either
collaborated with or were employed by the former Securitate during the
Communist regime. The fact that journalists can now interview intelligence
personnel in their theaters of operations is a great achievement. Thus,
oversight by the civil society ensures that the intelligence agencies are
accountable to the Romanian people, while still understanding the need
for secrecy.47
COUNCIL FOR STUDYING SECURITATE ARCHIVES (CNSAS)
The CNSAS, set up following enactment of the 1999 Ticu Dumitrescu Law,48
was expected to permit access to former Securitate files, the taking over of the
millions of said files, a facilitation of Romanians’ access to personal files,
and, most importantly, an examination of the past connections of
prominent public officials. But what was expected to become a powerful
scrutiny mechanism turned out to be an ineffective institution for several
years, due to past administrations’ continuous attempts to block the
handing over of the files on the pretext of national security. A few years
later, the Basescu administration, which began in 2004, decided to open a
new path toward transparency by opening all the files. Upon the President’s
demand, the agencies, in 2006, provided over 1.3 million files to CNSAS,49
and a ‘‘process of Communism’’ has started: upon review of the files, some
politicians were identified as former collaborators and have been expelled
from the political parties to which they belonged and, perhaps, may be
excluded from their public positions. For instance, Mona Musca, a National
Liberal Party member of Parliament, former Minister, and, ironically, a
campaigner for the removal of ex-Communists from high office, has
admitted that she signed a contract of collaboration with the Securitate in
1977.50 President Basescu himself is fighting against accusations that he
collaborated with the Securitate during his years as a sailor. But, since his
file is missing (though many do not believe this is true), such allegations
have not been proven to date.51 In April 2007, the Romanian Parliament
suspended President Basescu on charges of power abuse. In May, Basescu
won the referendum to remain in power.
Concerns remain that not everybody gets the same treatment if found to be
a Securitate collaborator. Party colleagues argue that Mona Musca was
expelled primarily because she was rather unaccommodating to the party
and not merely due to her pledge to collaborate with the former political
police. If, in the long run, exposed ex-Securitate informants and officers
are excluded from participation in politics and government, the CNSAS
will have indeed become a ‘‘watchdog hired by the Parliament.’’52
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The Romanian Constitution provides for an Ombudsman, or Advocate of
the People, to defend citizens’ rights and freedoms ex officio and upon
request by individuals aggrieved in their rights by governmental action or
inaction.53 The Ombudsman’s activities include investigations and
hearings, as well as reports and recommendations to both chambers of
Parliament concerning legislation or other suggestions pertaining to
citizens’ civil liberties and protection of rights. With the amendment of the
Constitution in October 2003, the Ombudsman was empowered to
comment on the constitutionality of legislation prior to its entry into
force. People in Romania seem to trust this mechanism, as in 2004, the
Ombudsman received 4,621 mailed and 2305 telephonic complaints,
conducted 5,971 hearings and 38 investigations and issued eight reports
and two special reports.54
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (ECHR)
The ECHR was established in 1959 in Strasbourg to deal with alleged
infringements of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. Any
state or individual claiming to be a victim of a violation of the Convention
has the right to send an application directly to the ECHR alleging a
breach by one of the Convention states of one of the Convention’s
rights.55 A concrete example of the ECHR’s value—added to the oversight
of the Romanian intelligence agencies was the Court’s resolution on the
Aurel Rotaru versus Romania case in 2000. Rotaru complained of an
infringement of his right to privacy, in that the SRI held a secret record
containing private=personal information, whose existence had been
publicly revealed during judicial proceedings. He claimed to be the victim
of a violation of the Convention, relying on Articles 13 (the right to an
effective remedy) and 6 (the right to a fair trial). Indeed, in the ECHR’s
judgment delivered in this case, the Court unanimously voted there had
been a violation of both Articles; and by a vote of 16 to 1, that there had
been a violation of Article 8 (the right to respect for private life) of the
European Convention on Human Rights; in addition, under Article 41
(‘‘for just satisfaction’’) of the Convention, the Court awarded the
applicant 63,450 French francs for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages
and for legal costs and expenses.56 ECHR also demanded that Romania
change its SRI legislation.57 As a result of many cases lost by the
Romanian state at various European tribunals, proposals were forwarded
to amend the penal code. To this end, if Romania loses in the European
Courts, the Romanian magistrates, rather than the Romanian state, will be
compelled to pay the damages to the citizens. This will be a significant step
toward a better judiciary, with more professional and fewer corrupt officials.
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Basically, the existence and functioning of a newly restored civil society,
CNSAS, Ombudsman, and ECHR have strengthened the oversight of
intelligence by ensuring transparency and enforcing protection of citizens’
rights and liberties.
DEMOCRATIZATION, REFORM, AND EFFECTIVENESS
The transformation and democratization of the intelligence agencies have
involved modern personnel selection, education, and training policies—
following the European and Euro–Atlantic model—greater openness to the
public, and strengthened cooperation with domestic and international
counterparts. Major determinants have been Romania’s desire to ‘‘return
to Europe,’’ mainly through NATO and EU membership; effective
oversight by the Romanian media, which exposed the intelligence agencies
any time they opposed democratic change; and, the 11 September 2001
events, when reform became a roundtable topic for government, political,
and civil society sectors.
Structure
One drawback to the effective oversight of the intelligence agencies was their
large number, in itself subjecting Romania to continuous criticism by
Western countries, NGOs, and the media, which have repeatedly
recommended that Bucharest decrease their number. This has been one of
the slowest areas of reform. Although now reduced to six intelligence
agencies, concerns remain on the duplication of responsibilities. Attempts
to further decrease58 the number of agencies have failed, as the new draft
law package on national security stipulates that the STS and SPP remain
independent.59
Personnel and Career Development
Notwithstanding the reason,60 the continuity of the former Securitate
employees—in particular those who were corrupt, did political policing
roles, and violated human rights—was a setback for reform and
professionalization, in general, and for Romania’s chances to NATO and
EU membership, in particular.61 Due to the media’s and Western
countries’ continuous criticism, the intelligence agencies have gradually
reduced their former Communist personnel to a low percentage.62 Some of
them retired early, and others, if they failed to adapt to the democratic
intelligence principles and rules, were fired without hesitation. The
intelligence agencies have opened their doors to younger generations,
mostly graduates from universities or representatives of civil society, with
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pro-Western attitudes and generally flawless conduct.63 As well, vocation has
become a very important personnel selection and assignment criterion; a
reflective or introspective person may more likely become an analyst, while
a more dynamic person, occupied in the search for new ventures or able to
sense or notice things rapidly, is likely to become a collector.64 The
selection of counterterrorism personnel involves additional, specific
personal criteria.65
Personnel management policies have been aimed at strengthening
relationships, not only among employees but also between superiors and
subordinates. With increased mutual trust and respect between superiors
and their subordinates, careers can be based on personal motivation, and
the agencies’ promotion system based more on merit and performance.66
Bucharest has also invested in intelligence education and professional
training. The Romanian National Intelligence Academy (ANI) and the
Higher National Security College (HNSC), created by the SRI, are the
main education institutions in intelligence and security issues. The ANI,
open to all intelligence agencies, educates future agents in specific
intelligence issues, foreign languages, legal matters, understanding of
foreign cultures and religions, as well as technical skills. The HNSC is
open to intelligence agencies, public authorities and parliamentarians, civic
organizations (particularly those concerned with the defense and security
sectors), journalists, and independent analysts and educators on security
and intelligence issues. It is equally useful in developing the expertise of
both those selected to control and oversee the activity of the intelligence
system and of those who work for it. Both institutions use Western and
NATO faculties, while their curricula reflect the new doctrines of the
intelligence agencies, based on current threats. Besides ANI and HNSC, all
intelligence personnel avail themselves of the education and training system
within the armed forces, including the National Defense University,
Technical Military Academy, National Defense College, and Defense
Resources Regional Management Center.67
Each institution has its internal education centers and departments that
provide specialized training. For combating organized crime the SRI has a
center (functioning through SECI), that organizes different joint activities
and exercises for Romanian and foreign intelligence agencies. SPP has a
training center that instructs on matters related to protection, guardian
duties, and antiterrorist intervention. And the DGIA’s human intelligence
(HUMINT) battalion has specific military intelligence training facilities,
including a training hangar for paratroopers and an underground shooting
range. In addition, the agencies have specific departments for the
psychological training of personnel who specialize in fighting terrorism.
Very important has been foreign support and cooperation for educating
and professionalizing both the intelligence agencies and the institutions
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working on security matters, such as the programs conducted by the Center
for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) and the Marshall Center. These
programs promote democracy, respect for human rights, military justice
administration, and civilian control of the military and intelligence.
The reform effort has sought the demilitarization of the agencies, with
benefits for structure, personnel, and management that include added
flexibility, changed mentalities, and greater motivation. While the
demilitarization of DGIPI has been completed as part as a larger process
of police demilitarization, the companion for the SRI and SIE process has
been rather slow, although debates on this issue have occurred in
Parliament several times. Nevertheless, the new set of draft bills on
security and intelligence stipulates that the two agencies will become
demilitarized and their employees will have civil servant status.68
Another reform difficulty was the issue of the early retirement for former
Securitate employees. Many of them became the first generation of
Romanian businessmen, using unregistered funding,69 while others created
parallel private intelligence agencies which compete with the government
institutions. These individuals helped expand corruption and blackmail by
maintaining their connections with past informers and collaborators,
making use of information extracted from Securitate files for blackmail.70
For a long time, little71 was done regarding this problem, but the new law
on the status of the intelligence officers, currently awaiting parliamentary=
CSAT approval, along with other bills on intelligence and security issues,
will likely improve the situation. According to the new legislation,
intelligence personnel rated as incompetent or no longer employed by the
secret services because of psychological condition will be redirected to the
national public servant agency to get new jobs, including positions in other
governmental structures, based on their skills and training. Moreover, an
intelligence salary law is to be drafted stipulating that intelligence officers
will be granted a special allowance when they retire.72
NATO/EU IMPACT ON THE DEMOCRATIZATION, REFORM,
AND EFFECTIVENESS
The international community has made a tremendous contribution to the
acceleration of intelligence reform. NATO=EU membership has been
considered by Romanians a recognition of their country’s return to its de
facto geopolitical place in Europe, which goes back long before
Communism. Romania had established strong ties with European
countries of Latin origin, based on common legacies.73 This affiliation was
negated during many decades of Soviet influence. In this context, major
changes within the intelligence system have happened as part of Romania’s
preparation for accession to NATO and the EU. The requirements of the
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two organizations in return for membership—NATO’s Membership Action
Plan (MAP) and EU’s Acquis Communautaire—served as guides to the
complex process of intelligence reform. These requirements included:
establishing democratic control; achieving interoperabil ity and
compatibility with the Atlantic Alliance’s members; and harmonization of
domestic legislation with the Western countries.
Within the control and oversight context, in the early 1990s, Romania
established the legal framework for intelligence oversight with the
adoption of the Law of National Security and Constitution in 1991, as
well as legislation on the organization and functioning of each intelligence
agency. Romania currently has a dynamic and robust oversight system,
encompassing the control of the executive, legislative, and judicial, as well
as the public sector and media. Amendments to the legislation, which
included the adoption of a new Constitution in 2003, continue to be
adopted.
Within the context of interoperability and compatibility, the various
agencies have ensured the procurement of advanced equipment and
technologies and the modernization of old ones, in particular with regard
to technical intelligence, meaning systems of communications and
protection of information. A new military communications system, with
modern technologies and equipment, was procured in collaboration with
the Marconi concern, to be fully interoperable with NATO by 2010;74 a
modern INFOSEC system was procured to ensure the protection of
electronic and computer systems that are used to create, process,
disseminate, and deposit classified information; the DGIA is developing a
maritime counterterrorism program by modernizing its HUMINT,
SIGINT, IMINT, and MASINT capabilities, while other agencies have
improved their cyber intelligence (CYBERINT) capabilities.
Romania is one of the few NATO members to have an Integrated Multi-
source Collection Capability (IMCC), which receives information from
theaters of operation as well as from operational and strategic sources, and
uses HUMINT, IMINT, MASINT, and SIGINT.75 The Center filters only
that information relevant to the commander of the force deployed in a
particular theater, independent of the source, and sends the final product,
known as the ‘‘intelligence summary (INTSUM)’’ to the force commander
daily. The Romanian commander in Iraq, therefore, receives a different
INTSUM as compared with his counterparts in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and
Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Center also prepares a daily digest of intelligence
reports for both the political and military decisionmakers in both the
country and NATO commands.
In addition, Romania has developed an Integrated Image Intelligence
System (I3S) within the Military Technical Academy since 2001. I3S uses a
convergence between IMINT and geospatial data to support the military
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operations in real time, meaning real time multispectral, multitemporal,
multisource images, and geospatial data.76
Enactment of the Act on preventing and combating terrorism, the creation
of the ‘‘National System of Terrorist Alert,’’ and the special forces battalion
to combat terrorism, have also proven the legal and operational
compatibility with European standards of Romania’s combating of
terrorism efforts.
One of the most critical interoperability requirements by NATO=EU was
protection of classified information as part of a larger process of interagency
intelligence sharing and participation in joint missions.77 The Partnership for
Peace (PfP) and NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP) imposed both
legislative and institutional reforms on Romania in order to achieve
NATO’s level of safeguarding classified information. A law on classified
information was adopted in 2002 and a National Registry Office for
Classified Information (ORNISS) was created78 to establish norms,
instructions, and procedures for the protection of national and NATO
classified information; ensure the compliance with both national and
NATO standards of handling classified information; and to grant security
clearances to the personnel selected for access to NATO classified
information and=or participate in NATO actions. In parallel, all personnel
who work with NATO classified information will undergo a background
check and receive a security clearance before being able to share NATO
classified information.79 NATO’s Office of Security (NOS) monitoring
teams, which frequently visited the Romanian intelligence agencies and the
ORNISS before Romania’s membership in 2004, viewed as positive the
process of personnel screening and classified information management.
Romania was the only state among the latest accepted members that fully
met the NATO requirements prior to accession.80
Within the current legislative harmonization context, and to ensure the
compatibility of the Romanian legislation with that of the EU, four bills
on national security are being debated in Parliament. They relate to
national defense, intelligence, counterintelligence information and security,
a national system for crisis management, SIE, SRI, and the status of
intelligence officers. A particular EU membership requirement for
intelligence is the implementation of Chapter 24 provisions on justice and
home affairs (border control, illegal migration, drug smuggling and money
laundering, organized crime, police and judicial cooperation, and data
protection). The fulfillment of the Chapter 24 provisions is underway; the
DGIPI and SRI have joined their efforts to internalize and implement
these European regulations. Other requirements mandate that Romania
reduce its intelligence agencies to three, and institute changes on the use of
classified information gathered by former Securitate. This became
especially important following the Rotaru case.
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The Impact of 11 September 2001 on Reform and Effectiveness
The tragic events of 11 September 2001 added a new dimension to Romania’s
intelligence reform process. Rapid changes occurred in the legislation,
structures, doctrines, personnel, education, and training of the intelligence
sector as an adjustment to international efforts for countering terrorism.
Special focus was put on interagency cooperation at both the domestic and
international levels.
Immediately after the terrorist attacks on the United States, Romania
adopted new legislation on preventing and combating terrorism, terrorist
financing, organized crime, and human trafficking. Parliament approved
Romania’s participation, alongside NATO, in countering terrorist actions
and operations.81
The SRI was designated by the CSAT as the nation’s authority in
anti-terrorist activities. It coordinated the adoption of The National
Strategy on Preventing and Combating Terrorism in 2002, which regulates
the roles of all security institutions. This led, in 2004, to the creation of a
National System on Preventing and Combating Terrorism, an integrated
structure focusing on prevention and countering terrorist threats.82 In
2001, the SRI had established a Department for Preventing and
Combating Terrorism, featuring a Center of Counter-Terrorist Operational
Coordination as a permanent technical coordinator of the interacting
agencies within the National System on Preventing and Combating
Terrorism. The Center’s responsibilities include collection and analysis, as
we l l as f i e ld intervent ion . The SRI i s author i zed to conduct
counterterrorism operations in case targets are attacked or occupied by
terrorists; to capture or annihilate them; free hostages; and restore legal
order. Its antiterrorist brigade is capable of deploying and carrying out
ground, air, and maritime missions everywhere in Romania within a
maximum two-and-a-half hours. The SIE’s elite intervention unit, trained
in the U.S. at Delta bases, specializes in possible interventions outside
Romanian territory, as in freeing hostages and embassies.83
Other agencies besides the SRI underwent structural changes after 9=11. SIE
was also reorganized, based on the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
model. STS implemented within Romania the continent-wide European
emergency call number 1-1-2, for reporting on fires, accidents, medical
emergencies, disasters, and other events that require immediate response.84
This system allows the STS to localize the call, even if the caller is unable to
give details, as well as to identify whether the call is a false alarm or not.
Additional measures included the setting up, with U.S. assistance and
following the U.S. Special Forces model, of a special forces antiterrorism
battalion for out-of-area operations under NATO or Multinational Forces
command, in accordance with the need to develop, at the national level,
special capabilities required by joint operations.85 This battalion will, if
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called upon, carry out strategic reconnaissance and direct action tasks, and
will assist in training other countries. It is to be fully operational by the
end of 2007, and interoperable in a multinational military context.
INTERAGENCY COOPERATION
The National Doctrine on Security Intelligence, approved by the CSAT in
2004, defines the national security concept, establishes the general
framework of the intelligence activities and guidance on collection,
analysis, and dissemination, and stipulates domestic and international
cooperation of the institutions.
At the national level, a cooperation protocol among the SRI, SIE, SPP,
STS, Ministry of Interior, and Ministry of Defense was approved by the
CSAT, to establish the operational exchange and sharing of information
among all agencies.86 Despite an improved level of cooperation among all
these agencies, however, some concrete situations called for a functional
intelligence community, based on integrated intelligence planning and
coordination, information sharing, better use of resources, improved
collection and dissemination, reduced bureaucracy, and minimized
redundancy and overlapping. A National Intelligence Community (CNI)
was created in November 2005 under the National Defense Supreme
Council (CSAT), an analysis structure aimed at corroborating information
and bringing all current agencies under the same umbrella, to work on the
principles of integrity of the disseminated intel l igence and the
accountability of each CNI component.87 The CNI aims to foster
interagency cooperation and coordination, with the ultimate goal of
increasing professionalism. The CNI will benefit from receiving both a
summary of intelligence reports and raw intelligence material from each of
its components.88 All agencies within the CNI are currently working
together to find the best way of providing the decisionmakers with good
quality intelligence and integrated analyses in order to set the bases of the
best national security policies. So far, the CNI exists de facto.89 Whether it
will become an all-source agency or yet another layer of bureaucracy with
little value added is unclear. Its final organization and functioning will be
established through law and by the adoption of a new national strategy.
Skeptics fear the CNI was created to increase the President’s powers at the
expense of the Prime Minister, but its coordination through the CSAT,
which includes the President, the Prime Minister and a number of Ministers,
decreases this risk. Nevertheless, within the government, parallel to the CNI,
functions a ‘‘center for situations’’ based in the Prime Minister’s chancellery,
which grants the Prime Minister access to intelligence analyses and reports
of the agencies without prior passage through the CNI.90 To date, little is
known about the CNI’s personnel and budget, and whether or not the CNI
will be subjected to parliamentary oversight.
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At the international level, Romanian intelligence established special
partnerships with NATO and EU, as well as other counterparts, on
intelligence-sharing and collaboration to counter the new challenges.
Romanian intelligence is part of numerous organizations, such as the
Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI), which is based on
European regional cooperation to solve transnational problems, as well as
the Egmont Group, an international network of financial intelligence
agencies created by the U.S. to exchange information in cases of money
laundering and terrorism financing.91 Romania also contributes to
international peace, stabilization, and reconstruction operations alongside
foreign partners: in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, with National
Intelligence Cells (RONIC) integrated in the Stabilization Force in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (SFOR) and Kosovo Force (KFOR) intelligence structures; in
Afghanistan, with a Detachment of Intelligence and Counterintelligence
within the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF);
and in Iraq, with a Military Intelligence Detachment in the Multinational
Division Center South. Romania has a liaison officer integrated within the
coalition intelligence center in Tampa, Florida, to do collection and
analysis, as well as to coordinate the troops participating in ‘‘Enduring
Freedom.’’92
Essentially, the reform of Romanian intelligence has resulted in a
balanced, flexible, and effective intelligence structure, as well as reasonable
human resources management. The outcomes so far are an improved
perception of the intelligence agencies by the Romanians and others
abroad, as well as a greater awareness of the population about the need
for such institutions. The image change at the domestic level is mirrored
by an increased number of applications for the intelligence jobs.
Cases of Effectiveness
The intelligence agencies working on Romanian territory, as well as in other
theaters of operations, have done well in predicting and averting concrete
security risk factors and crises.
First, Romania’s domestic intelligence agencies have cooperated in
keeping under control trans-border, nonmilitary risk, and threat
developments that might have repercussions on national and international
security. Facing reality, Romanian analysts had predicted many of the
security-related events during recent years.93 As a result, on numerous
occasions, the agencies blocked human supply networks, ended
propaganda activities used by various terrorist and organized crime
organizations or groups in recruiting new members, and worked to
eliminate terrorist financing networks. Because none of the intelligence
agencies is a law enforcement body, they notified the legal authorities and
650 FLORINA CRISTIANA (CRIS) MATEI


































law enforcement institutions of their findings, and legal measures have been
taken against the suspects. The solved cases include: in 1991, annihilating and
capturing members of an extremist group who assassinated India’s
ambassador in Bucharest; in 1993, deporting a Japanese terrorist wanted
by Interpol for terrorist acts committed in 1974–1975; in 1996, identifying
a Hezbollah member who participated in a commando operation of
hijacking of a Trans World Airlines (TWA) flight between Athens and
Rome in 1985; in 2001, expelling a Lebanese citizen on suspicions of being
a member of the Hezbollah;94 in 2003, expelling an Iraqi consul from
Romania, on grounds he was attempting to organize a series of attacks on
Western and Israeli facilities in Bucharest, and the arrest and expelling of
the same person three years later, shortly after his return to Romania
under a false name and passport;95 in 2005, annihilation of an Islamic
radical group of five al-Qaeda members, which had recruited new followers
in Romania and tried to recruit foreign citizens of the Muslim religion;96
in 2006, arresting a Jordanian suspected of allegiance to the Muslim
Brothers group;97 in 2006, arresting in Timisoara a bomb plot suspect
suspected of affiliation to several terrorist organizations and planning to
stage a terror attack in response to the close U.S.–Romania relationship.
This suspect had made a video message threatening Romania and sent it
on the Internet to several television, networks, including Al Jazeera and
CNN.98
Second, Romania has demonstrated its HUMINT and IMINT expertise
and potential within certain hostile operational environments. Effective
Coalition forces’ HUMINT collection capabilities in Iraq were perhaps
eased by the close relationship between Romanian and Iraqi people going
back in history, making Iraqis more open to the Romanian troops than to
the other Coalition forces. Romanian HUMINT is sometimes envied by
foreign allies.99 Likewise, agencies’ I3S capabilities have proven very useful
to the multinational coalition during the ‘‘Iraqi Freedom’’ operation.
Using real-time multispectral, multitemporal, multisource images and
geospatial data, Romania’s GEOINT system has identified and monitored
enemy vehicles, numerous illegal explosives, ammunition and armament
caches.100
Third, the intelligence agencies have proven their professionalism during
crisis situations. They played an important role in the release of three
Romanian journalists taken hostage in Iraq, cooperating with the
Coalition agencies and Iraqi services, and the agencies of other Arab
states.101 In addition, the intelligence services were critical in the release of
a French journalist, kidnapped at the same time as the Romanian
journalists. French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin acknowledged
the help of ‘‘Romania and its officials.’’102 Both operations were heavily
criticized by various groups on grounds of using former ties with the Arab
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world in order to free the journalists, but despite that criticism, what stands
out is that both operations had the desired result: freedom for the abducted
journalists.
Last, the professionalism and effectiveness of the new intelligence agencies
in the joint fight on terrorism has been repeatedly recognized by foreign
counterparts. The Polish Division Commander in Ad-Dwanivah, Iraq,
acknowledged the capability of Romanian intelligence troops during crisis
situations, to quickly assess and inform the allies of potential future threats
and events.103 The appointment by the Pentagon in December 2006 of a
Romanian general to coordinate the Operations Directorate of the
Multinational Force in Iraq was also proof of international recognition of
Romania as a reliable ally.104
SLOW BUT SPLENDID PROGRESS
Romania’s progress in the democratization and professionalization of its
intelligence agencies has been remarkable: the new Romanian intelligence
community has gained both the confidence of the domestic populace and
the appreciation and esteem of its Western partners. It did not happen
overnight, but was rather slow, with many barriers to overcome, but
Romanian intelligence has transitioned from a tool of the Communist
dictatorship to a professional, transparent, and effective intelligence
community, under democratic control.
The reform has been twofold: it was imposed by both the democratic
transformation and consolidation of Romania, and by the rapid changes in
the security environment after the end of the Cold War.
The country’s desire for integration into the EU and NATO has been a
strong impetus for progress. Partnerships with both institutions (established
even before Romania’s full membership) have paved the way for the
country’s rebounding with European democracy and security values,
practices, and goals, and have been instrumental for Romanian
intelligence’s democratic accomplishments. According to President
Basescu, the Romanian intelligence agencies actually joined the Euro–
Atlantic structures ahead of the country itself.105 New threats have
entailed security changes and brought Romanian intelligence even closer
to the Euro–Atlantic cultures. In addition, a dynamic civil society and an
increasingly assertive media have played a tremendous role in the
democratization, effectiveness, and transparency of Romania’s intelligence
services. These changes led to improved intelligence legislation
(establishing both intelligence mandates and limitations); strong
democratic control and oversight mechanisms (limiting intelligence’s
power); high personnel and career management standards (combining
motivation and challenges with education and training opportunities);
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new strategies and doctrines (better fitting the changing security
requirements); transparency (bringing them closer to the society); and
cooperation (increasing their effectiveness).
Notwithstanding all these successes, reform continues to be a work in
progress. The legal framework continues to be improved to better fit the
democratic pattern of today’s professional intelligence communities. To
this end, a new package of bills on national security is currently being
debated, providing for clearer intelligence mandates and restricted powers,
a decreased number of agencies, better personnel management, increased
oversight, and more transparency.106 New anticorruption legislation has
been, and continues to be, passed with the EU’s guidance, helping to
produce concrete results for the citizens’ benefit. Moreover, as NATO and
the EU continue their transformation, Romania continues its security
reform as well, to better carry out its membership responsibilities.
Despite mistrust, old habits, and setbacks, the former Securitate ‘‘stigma’’
has today largely faded away. Its replacement is an intelligence system with
redefined democratic roles and missions, more accountable and less
politicized, engaged in international cooperation, better serving as a de
facto state structure and a reliable partner. In other words, Romania has
successfully handled the challenge that all democracies encounter when
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